从历史教训看希腊退出欧元

当前的欧元区危机并非没有先例。事实上，在欧元之前，欧洲经历过不少货币联盟的安排，一些成功，而另一些则没有那么成功。历史我们现在已经上了一两课。例如，一个不太为人所知的事实是希腊曾经在1908年由于行为不当而被当时的拉丁货币联盟拒绝。这本来应当成为欧盟在2001年宣布希腊符合欧洲货币联盟条件之前认真考虑的事情。

在欧元推出之前在欧洲最近的一次货币联盟则是捷克和斯洛伐克的共同货币区。它创设于1993年1月1日，就在原来的捷克斯洛伐克一分为二之时。这两个新国家分别享有政治上的独立性，但是确保维持紧密的经济联系：有海关联盟，有共同劳动市场，当然也还有共同货币。总之，这个迷你型货币联盟的真实故事至今还在讨论之中。最后，这一迷你型的货币联盟却很快夭折了，连名字还没来得及取。姑且我们称之为捷克-斯洛伐克货币联盟吧。

当欧洲货币联盟的规则被写入《马约》时，有一些重要的要素是缺位的。欧元区没有财政保险机制、没有统一的银行监管机构、没有具有很强执行力的政治领导层。或者说，它先天就被设计为经济和货币联盟，而不是财政联盟、银行联盟或政治联盟。当它启动时，与当初捷克和斯洛伐克设计的货币联盟完全一样。那么捷克—斯洛伐克货币联盟对欧元的前景有些什么启示呢？

教训一：良好的制度设计和强有力的政治决心都非常关键。捷克—斯洛伐克货币联盟在制度设计上就先天不足：除了没有财政保险的机制和统一的银行监管部门外，也没有共同的中央银行。货币政策是被一些来自双方的代表组成的中央委员会来决定，这种安排是各方互不让步最后陷入僵局。更重要的是，货币联盟被宣布为一种过渡性安排：最初说是6个月，但留了根据需要可能延长的活口。公开宣布结束日实际上等于邀请个人投资者和机构投资者来赌这种共同货币。果然，投资者充分地利用了这一点，使这一体系的存活时间不说没有6个月连6周都没到。今天，我们焦虑地看到，欧洲政治家们正在犯同样的错误用希腊退出欧元的可能性作为谈判的筹码。这一次，投资者也利用了这一点：希腊（还包括西班牙）的银行几个月来存款大量流失。

教训二：赌共同货币崩溃的成本是较小的，而潜在的收益是巨大的。在1992年底和1993年初，斯洛伐克的居民和企业通过将存款换成硬货币或将他们存入捷克的银行来避免引入一种新的较弱的斯洛伐克货币的风险。在共同货币不再成立时，他们得到了大约20%的回报。对希腊人来说，赌希腊退出更加容易，因为他们不需要将资金转出希腊：只要将储蓄用欧元纸币保存而不是用银行账户形式保存就够了。其成本就是，到银行取钞票的路上成本、随后几周或几个月的利息损失以及租一个银行保管箱（或者用500欧元一张的票子放在衣柜中的鞋盒里）的租金。风险也是非常低的，如果欧元还将在希腊外继续流通的话，那么鞋盒里的100欧元钞票的价值还会保持不变，而在希腊银行中的欧元账户将会自动转换成贬值得一塌糊涂的希腊货币（如果希腊真的退出的话）。

第三，散伙是件容易做的事情。撤销捷克—斯洛伐克货币联盟的决定是在1993年2月2日（周二）晚上作出的。在余下的几周内两个国家的支付清算被搁置下来，边境控制得到加强。在转换期，没有新的硬币和钞票发出。相反，每个国家通过对纸币加戳的办法来区分在本国境内流通的纸币。对个人账户转换为现金有严格的数量限制，确保大多数货币转换成银行存款。到2月8日（周一）早晨，两种货币完全分离了。在随后的一段时间内，两个国家继续使同样的硬币和加了印章的纸币，六个月后，新的硬币和纸币替代了原来的捷克斯洛伐克货币。

在希腊，如果允许人们持有欧元直到新的货币的汇率得到稳定为止，就不大可能有大量的货币会换成新货币，这就将使得希腊银行的任务变得非常简单，但也会给欧洲中央银行带来了额外的麻烦，欧洲银行需要考虑对付希腊欧元的潮水般的流入。这就是说，除非欧洲中央采取一些非常规的手段，如对待希腊发行的欧元（系列号上以Y开头的钞票即是）与希腊货币一样，在其余欧元区国家是不能使用的。

总之，希腊退出的可能性仍然很大，而且可能不一定仅仅是希腊退出。对于个人投资者和机构投资者来说，赌希腊留在欧元区的成本是很小的，而其潜在的收益则是巨大的。如果形势变得不能维持不下去了（例如，如果希腊不能满足下一次救助方案的条件），希腊退出则将很快会启动而不需要太多的事先告示。为了避免这种情况发生，希腊和欧元区其他国家的债权人需要显示比以往更大的政治决心来力挽狂澜。长期来说，欧元区自身需要改革。在结束本文之前，我要传达的积极信息就是，危机很有希望成为进一步改革的催化剂，通过改革给我们留下一个设计得更好、更有活力的货币联盟。不过，可能在改革尚未完成之时，希腊不在其中了。

（作者扬·费德默克（Jan Fidrmuc）系英国布雷内尔大学经济金融系高级讲师，由欧明刚翻译）

Grexit. Lessons from history.

The current Eurozone crisis is not unprecedented. In fact, Europe has seen a number of monetary unions in the past, some successful, others less so. History can teach us a lesson or two about the present. For instance, not many people know that Greece was already punished for misbehaving by being ejected from a monetary union – in 1908, from the so-called Latin Monetary Union (this perhaps should have given food for thought to the European Commission before they declared Greece fit for EMU membership in 2001).

The last monetary union formed in Europe prior to the introduction of the euro was the common currency zone of the Czech and Slovak Republics. It was created on 1^st January 1993, in the wake of the break-up of Czechoslovakia. The two new nations embraced political independence but pledged to maintain close economic ties: customs union, common labor market, and, yes, common currency. In short, a mini-EMU, at a time when the real thing was still being discussed.

In the end, however, this mini-EMU turned out to be so short-lived that it didn’t even earn a name. Let’s call it therefore the Czech-Slovak Monetary Union, or CSMU.

When the rules for the EMU were laid down in the Maastricht Treaty, several features were notable by their absence. The Eurozone was to have no fiscal-insurance mechanism, no central bank supervisor and no political leadership with executive powers. In other words, it was designed to be an economic and monetary union, but not a fiscal union, banking union or political union. As it happens, this is exactly what the Czechs and Slovak had in mind for their monetary union. So what does the example of CSMU teach us about the prospects for the EMU?

Lesson 1: Both sound institutional design and strong political commitment are crucial. 

The CSMU was institutionally weak: besides having no fiscal-insurance mechanism and no common bank supervisor, it also lacked a common central bank. Instead, monetary policy was set by a central committee composed of equal number of representatives of each side: an institutional set-up that invites impasse. More importantly, the monetary union was announced as a potentially temporary measure: initially for six months, with the possibility of further extensions thereafter. Saying publicly that the end-point might be in sight invites investors (individual and institutional ones alike) to bet against the common currency. Not surprisingly, the investors took the cue and did the CSMU in: not in six months but in less than six weeks. It is worrying to see that European politicians are making the same mistake now by using the possibility of a Grexit as a bargaining chip. Again, investors are taking the cue: Greek (and Spanish) banks have been haemorrhaging deposits for months.

Lesson 2: Betting on the collapse of the common currency is cheap while the potential profits are huge. 

In the late 1992 and early 1993, Slovak households and firms sought to hedge against the possibility of the introduction of a new and weaker Slovak currency by converting deposits into hard currency or transferring them to Czech banks. They were rewarded by a handy profit of approximately 20 percent after the currency separation. For Greeks, betting on Grexit is even easier because they do not even have to transfer funds out of Greece: keeping their savings in paper currency rather than in banks will suffice. The cost of this is a trip to the bank, foregoing interest for a few weeks or months and renting a bank safe-deposit box (or keeping a stash of €500 bills in a shoe box at the bottom of one’s wardrobe). The risk is very low too: assuming the euro will continue circulating outside Greece, the value of €100 held in a shoebox will stay the same whereas €100 held in a Greek bank will be automatically converted to drachmas – and then devalued – if Grexit happens.

Lesson 3: Breaking-up is easy to do. 

The decision to disband the CSMU was announced in the evening of 2^nd February 1993 (Tuesday). Payments between the two countries were suspended and border controls increased during the remainder of the week. No new coins and banknotes were issued during the changeover. Instead, each country distinguished the notes in circulation on its territory by means of a paper stamp affixed to the face of the banknote. Strict limits were imposed on the amount that individuals were allowed to convert in cash, thus ensuring that most currency was converted as bank balances. By Monday morning, 8^th February, the two currencies were fully separate. Both countries continued using the same coins, and stamped banknotes, for considerable time: new coins and banknotes replaced the old Czechoslovak currency only gradually over the next six months.

In Greece, it is unlikely that much currency will be submitted for conversion into drachmas, given the incentive to hold on to euros until the new euro-drachma exchange rate is stabilized. This will make the task of the Bank of Greece easier but will pose an additional headache for the ECB which will need to deal with the influx of Greek euros. That is, unless the ECB can come up with some unconventional solution such as, for example, treating euros issued in Greece (those with serial numbers starting with a Y) as Greek currency not valid in the remainder of the Eurozone.

In summary, the prospect of a Grexit still looms large – and the Eurozone unraveling need not involve only Greece. The costs of betting against Greece staying in are small and the potential gains to individuals and investors from such bets so are large. If the situation becomes unsustainable – for instance, if Greece does not meet the conditions for another installment of the bailout package – the Grexit can be executed quickly and without much advance notice. To avert it, both the Greeks and their creditors in the rest of the Eurozone need to display more political commitment to pull through than so far. In the longer term, the Eurozone itself needs to be reformed. And this is my positive message to conclude this article: this crisis will hopefully serve as a catalyst for reform that will leave us with a better designed and more robust monetary union. Even if it may not count Greece among its members by the time the reform is over.

 Jan Fidrmuc